BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//C2SMART Home - ECPv6.15.19//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:C2SMART Home
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://c2smart.engineering.nyu.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for C2SMART Home
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:UTC
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:UTC
DTSTART:20200101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=UTC:20210908T150000
DTEND;TZID=UTC:20210908T160000
DTSTAMP:20260408T095759
CREATED:20210902T204704Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210902T204704Z
UID:1480-1631113200-1631116800@c2smart.engineering.nyu.edu
SUMMARY:Incentive Design for Promoting Ridesharing
DESCRIPTION:Traffic congestion has become a serious issue around the globe\, partly owing to single-occupancy commuter trips. Ridesharing can present a suitable alternative for serving commuter trips. However\, there are several important obstacles that impede ridesharing systems from becoming a viable mode of transportation\, including the lack of a guarantee for a ride back home as well as the difficulty of obtaining a critical mass of participants. At this event\, Neda Masoud will discuss a study which addresses these obstacles by introducing a Traveler Incentive Program (TIP) to promote community-based ridesharing with a ride-back home guarantee among commuters. The TIP program allocates incentives to (1) directly subsidize a select set of ridesharing rides\, and (2) encourage a few\, carefully selected set of travelers to change their travel behavior. We formulate the underlying ride-matching problem as a budget-constrained min-cost flow problem and present a Lagrangian Relaxation-based algorithm with worst-case optimality bound to solve large-scale instances of this problem in polynomial time. We further propose a polynomial-time budget-balanced version of the problem. Numerical experiments suggest that allocating subsidies to change travel behavior is significantly more beneficial than directly subsidizing rides. Furthermore\, using a flat tax rate as low as 1% can double the system’s social welfare in the budget-balanced variant of the incentive program. \nBio: Neda Masoud is an Assistant Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Michigan. She holds a Bachelor’s of Science Degree in Industrial Engineering and a Master’s of Science degree in Physics. She received her Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University of California Irvine. Her research focuses on devising operational and planning tools to facilitate the transition into the next generation of mobility systems\, which are envisioned to be connected\, automated\, electrified\, and shared.
URL:https://c2smart.engineering.nyu.edu/event/incentive-design-for-promoting-ridesharing/
LOCATION:Virtual\, 6 MetroTech Center\, Brooklyn\, NY\, 11201\, United States
CATEGORIES:Big Data & Planning for Smart Cities,Virtual Events,Webinars
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR